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FLIGHT SIMULATION AS AN INVESTIGATIVE TOOL FOR UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN FACTORS IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS
Bart Elias
The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service
Washington, DC

As aviation accidents become more complex, the need to better understand human factors aspects increasingly
requires more sophisticated investigative tools and techniques. The capabilities of modern research, engineering, and
flight training simulators provide human performance investigators with unique opportunities to reconstruct aviation
accidents and test hypotheses regarding possible causal and contributing human factors. Two recent examples - the
investigation of a flight test accident in October 2000, and the investigation of the crash of American Airlines flight
587 in November 2001 - highlight the potential role of flight simulation as an investigative tool. Building on these
experiences, agencies responsible for accident investigations may consider adopting more formal guidelines for
using flight simulation as a tool for understanding human factors in aviation accidents.
Background
Increasingly, human performance investigators are
turning to simulation to reconstruct complex
accidents and test specific hypotheses regarding
possible human factors aspects. The improved
fidelity and enhanced capabilities of modern
research, engineering, and training simulators provide
unique opportunities to reconstruct aviation accidents
and test hypotheses regarding possible causal and
contributing human factors. Using flight simulation,
members of an investigation team can experience an
accident reconstruction in an immersive environment
that provides great flexibility to examine the accident
sequence as a whole or focus on specific details.
Experiencing an accident reconstruction is, of course,
highly dependent on one’s background, training, and
perspective. For example, a pilot is likely to focus on
very different features than an aircraft performance
specialist or a simulator engineer. Similarly, an
airline or pilot union representative is likely to have a
very different perspective than an airline
manufacturer’s representative that they bring to bear
when assessing investigative activities conducted in a
simulator. Therefore, an emerging role for human
performance investigators is to lead multidisciplinary
teams through these simulator reconstructions and
synthesize the unique perspectives of team members
into a cohesive understanding of the reconstructed
accident sequence. Another emerging role for human
performance investigators is to develop and test
specific hypotheses regarding possible causal or
contributing human factors using flight simulation.

investigations that highlight the potential role of
flight simulation as an investigative tool for
understanding human factors in aviation accidents.
During the investigation of a recent flight test
accident in Wichita, Kansas, the investigation team
used both an engineering simulator and a motionbased training simulator to reconstruct the accident
and test hypotheses regarding pilot performance.
Also, during the investigation of the American
Airlines Flight 587 accident, the NTSB's human
performance group participated in an accident
reconstruction using a unique research simulator, the
NASA Ames Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS), and
examined upset recovery training procedures in the
airline’s training simulator.
Bombardier Challenger Flight Test Accident
Accident Summary. On October 10, 2000, a Canadair
Challenger, operated by Bombardier Incorporated,
crashed during initial climb from the Wichita MidContinent Airport (ICT), Kansas. The airplane was
departing for a test flight to evaluate stick force
characteristics of a new pitch-feel system (PFS)
installed for European certification requirements.
The aircraft’s center of gravity (CG) had been set at
the certified aft limit for the purposes of the flight
test. The pilot and flight test engineer were fatally
injured in the crash.
The copilot was seriously
injured and later died from his injuries. The NTSB
determined that the probable cause of the accident
was the pilot’s excessive takeoff rotation combined
with a rearward shift in the airplane’s CG due to fuel
migration that placed the airplane in a stall at too low
of an altitude for recovery (NTSB, 2004, April 14).

Case Studies
Both of these roles were exemplified in two recent
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Simulator Studies. A central issue in the investigation
was the possible contribution and potential interactions
between the pilot’s takeoff technique, the flight test’s
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Two studies were conducted in the Bombardier
Aerospace
reconfigurable
engineering
flight
simulator (REFS). In both studies, two type-rated
pilots flew takeoff runs in the REFS which was
configured with engineering models of the
Challenger aircraft. At the completion of each
takeoff run, the pilots provided a Cooper-Harper
rating assessing the airplane handling characteristics
with respect to pitch force, rotation rate, and ability to
capture and hold the target pitch attitude (see Cooper
and Harper, 1969).
The pilots also provided
comments on airplane handling characteristics.
The first study was conducted to assess the effects of
airplane CG location on rotation rate and the ability
to capture the target pitch attitude (nominally, 14
degrees). After completing several "familiarization
flight" takeoffs performed with the CG set at 37.9
percent mean aerodynamic chord (% MAC), the
pilots completed several takeoffs with the airplane’s
CG set at six different locations between 35% and
42% MAC. While the NTSB calculated the static
CG for the accident flight to be 37.9% MAC and the
airplane’s certified aft-CG limit is 38% MAC, four
CG positions aft of this limit were included in the test
because the NTSB determined that a rearward fuel
migration shifted the CG on the accident flight to
about 40.5% MAC.
The CG locations were randomly presented, and the
pilots were not told what CG location to expect for a
given takeoff. Each pilot completed two takeoffs at
each CG location using normal rotation techniques to
achieve a rotation rate of about 3 deg./s. Each of the
six CG locations was presented once before being
repeated in another randomly ordered set of six
takeoffs. Once the pilots had completed these 12
takeoffs using normal rotation techniques, they
completed another two takeoffs at each CG location.
However, for these takeoffs, the pilots were instructed
to use a more "aggressive" rotation technique to try to
achieve a rotation rate of about 6 deg./s.
Figure 1 presents the mean Cooper-Harper ratings for
each combination of CG location and rotation
technique. The pilots generally gave significantly
higher Cooper-Harper ratings, indicating more
handling difficulties, when they were instructed to
use increased rotation rates. CG location, on the
other hand, had no statistically significant effect on
the Cooper-Harper ratings. However, the pilots, in

general, commented that forward CG positions
caused the simulator control column to feel heavy,
while aft CG positions caused them to rotate at a
somewhat higher rate and overshoot target pitch
attitude slightly. The pilots generally noted that these
effects were more noticeable when they used
increased rotation rates. When increased rotation
rates were used, the pilots noted that the stick shaker
frequently activated, but usually for only short
periods of time. The pilots also indicated that the
simulator was controllable at all CG locations using
both normal and increased rotation rates.
10

Normal Rotation Rates
5
Increased Rotation Rates
Mean Cooper-Harper Rating

aft-CG configuration, and the PFS installed for testing.
To examine these issues in detail, the investigative
team conducted studies using an engineering simulator
and a level-D training simulator.
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Figure 1. Mean Cooper-Harper Ratings as a function of
CG location and rotation technique.

A second study was conducted in the REFS to assess
any perceptible differences between the handling
characteristics of the PFS installed for the flight test
in the accident airplane and the PFS installed on
certified Challenger airplanes at the time of the
accident. Each pilot performed takeoffs with either
the modified or production PFS units and provided
Cooper-Harper ratings and comments. The CG was
set at 40.5% MAC for each takeoff. The pilots
reported no handling differences between the
modified PFS and the production PFS and there were
no significant differences in Cooper-Harper ratings.
Studies were also conducted in a motion-based training
simulator. A reconstruction of the accident was played
in the training simulator to allow investigators to
experience the accident sequence. Also, a scaleddown version of the rotation rate study performed in
the REFS was conducted in the training simulator.
However, the most notable study conducted in the
training simulator was designed to examine the
perceptibility of rotation rates. At issue was whether
the accident pilot’s rotation technique was noticeably

220

The data were analyzed by comparing the estimated
(perceived) difference in peak rotation rates between
the sample takeoff flown by the accident pilot and the
comparison takeoff to the actual difference. The
mean differences between estimated and actual peak
rotation rates for each of accident pilot’s takeoffs
observed are shown in Figure 2. If the pilots had
accurately estimated the rotation rates, then these
values would be zero. Positive values reflect an
overestimation of pitch rate while negative values
indicate an underestimation. In general, there was a
slight tendency among the pilots to overestimate the
peak rotation rate for the flight with the lowest peak
rotation rate and underestimate the peak rotation rate
for flights with faster rotation rates. This trend was
somewhat more pronounced for pilots occupying the
right seat and performing PNF duties, but these
differences in ratings between left and right seat
observers were not statistically significant.
As evidenced from these studies, flight simulation
was used extensively to address specific human
performance questions regarding the handling
characteristics of the airplane and pilot rotation
technique. Human factors studies were conducted
using flight simulators to test hypotheses and support
conclusions regarding specific human factors aspects
of this accident. Flight simulation was also used
extensively to study pilot actions and flight control
systems characteristics in the crash of American
Airlines Flight 587.

3
ESTIMATED MINUS ACTUAL ROTATION RATE

more aggressive than recommended procedures dictate
during flights prior to the accident. The motion-based
simulator was back driven with recorded flight test
data from four Challenger takeoffs flown by the
accident pilot and one comparison takeoff flown by
another Bombardier flight test pilot. The peak pitch
rates of the sample takeoffs flown by the accident pilot
were 4, 6, 6.5 and 7 deg./s while the peak pitch rate of
the comparison takeoff was 3 deg./s. Three pilots took
turns experiencing the takeoffs from both the left and
right seats of the simulator. The right seat occupant
performed routine pilot not flying (PNF) duties during
each takeoff while the left seat occupant manually
followed the back-driven controls throughout each
takeoff. On each run, the pilots observed two takeoffs,
the comparison takeoff and one of the four sample
takeoffs flown by the accident pilot. The comparison
takeoff was presented either before or after the sample
takeoff and the participants were not told what takeoffs
they would be observing on any given run. After each
run, the pilots compared the perceived peak rotation
rate of the two takeoffs.
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Figure 2. Estimated minus actual peak rotation rates
derived from the rotation rate comparison data.

American Airlines Flight 587
Accident Summary. On the morning of November 12,
2001, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus A300600, was destroyed when it crashed into a residential
area shortly after takeoff from the John F. Kennedy
International Airport (JFK). All 260 on board and 5
people on the ground were killed in one of the
deadliest crashes in U.S. history.
The NTSB
determined that the airplane crashed following an inflight separation of the vertical stabilizer caused by
excessive and unnecessary rudder pedal inputs. The
NTSB also found that the rudder system design and
the techniques used to train the pilot in upset
recovery were contributing factors (NTSB, 2004).
Human factors were a central focus of this
investigation, and flight simulation proved to be an
important tool in studying these factors.
Simulator Studies.
To reconstruct the accident
sequence and examine the acceleration forces and
motions experienced by the pilots preceding the
accident, the NTSB conducted tests and observations
at the NASA Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS), a
unique facility located at Moffett Field, CA (NTSB,
2002, October 3). The VMS, depicted in Figure 3,
offers unparalleled capabilities for replicating large
amplitude motion cues. The VMS cab is mounted on
a six-degree-of-freedom motion platform that
provides the following motion capabilities, making it
the world's largest motion based simulator:
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Table 1. VMS Nominal Motion Limits
Motion

Range

Velocity

Acceleration

Vertical
Lateral

±30 ft
±20 ft

16 ft/sec
8 ft/sec

24 ft/sec/sec
16 ft/sec/sec

Longitudinal
Roll
Pitch
Yaw

±4 ft
±18 deg
±18 deg
±24 deg

4 ft/sec
40 deg/sec
40 deg/sec
46 deg/sec

10 ft/sec/sec
2
115 deg/s
2
115 deg/s
2
115 deg/s

Figure 3. A cutaway view of the NASA VMS facility
(NASA Ames Research Center, 2000, October).

The accident was reconstructed in the VMS using
data derived from the accident aircraft’s digital flight
data recorder (DFDR) and calculations made by
NTSB aircraft performance specialists.
Audio
segments of the accident aircraft’s cockpit voice
recorder (CVR) were synchronized for playback
during the simulations. The VMS simulator cab was
configured with two side-by-side pilot stations, each
equipped with three side-by-side CRT monitors. At
each station, the outboard monitor presented
graphical strip charts of the input (derived from
DFDR data) and actual (simulator cab recorded)

accelerations for pitch, roll, and yaw axes, and flight
control positions. The inboard monitor displayed a
compass rose navigation display and the center
monitor presented a primary flight display (PFD)
similar to those in Airbus A300-600 airplanes.
The cab motion, flight displays, primary flight controls
–including the rudder pedals, control wheel, control
column–and throttles were back-driven from
interpolated DFDR data during simulator runs.
Although the cab was equipped with gear, spoiler, and
flaps levers, these controls were not back-driven
during simulator sessions. Some observers elected to
manipulate these controls in response to CVR events
to further involve themselves in the accident
reconstruction. An out-the-window visual scene of
prominent visual features and coastline in the vicinity
of JFK airport was presented during simulator
sessions. The simulator sessions were videotaped and
a cockpit push-to-record button allowed participants to
record verbal comments for later reference.
After the nine member human performance group
spent two days experiencing the accident
reconstruction in the VMS, the group met to
formalize their consensus observations. The group
focused on the accelerations and motions produced
by encounters with wake turbulence and the
subsequent flight control inputs made by the first
officer on the accident flight. Many of the group
members described the first encounter with wake
turbulence as typical of a crossing wake encounter.
Some participants felt a slight yaw before the flight
controls moved. The slight yaw was described as a
characteristic motion of an A300 flying through
turbulence. This was followed by a vertical
acceleration, described by the participants as a
“bump”, that seemed to result from the wake
encounter rather than flight control movements. No
flight control inputs followed this event. The group
members generally agreed that “very slight” cab
motions were felt as a result of a second wake
turbulence encounter a few moments later that
immediately preceded the initial movements of the
control wheel and rudder pedal to the right. The cab
motions were described as “barely perceptible” left
lateral accelerations. Most participants did not
experience any cab motion until less than one second
before the first wheel motion. The first movements of
the control wheel and rudder pedal to the right were
considered to be “large and abrupt.” The participants
did not observe a visual or acceleration cue that
would cause a pilot to apply the magnitude of wheel
and pedal inputs observed. Transport pilots in the
group noted that the large magnitude and rapid speed
of these inputs were analogous to potential flight
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control inputs made during an avoidance maneuver.
After these first movements of the wheel and pedal to
the right, large lateral accelerations were felt, and
additional large, abrupt flight control movements in
the yaw, pitch, and roll axes were observed.
While the Airbus A300-600 is equipped with a
variable stop rudder system that limits rudder pedal
travel at higher airspeeds, the VMS was also used to
evaluate how the same reconstruction would feel
when equipped with a variable ratio rudder travel
limiter system that maintains full rudder pedal travel
at all airspeeds. During VMS runs in which a variable
ratio limiter system was simulated, some participants
felt that the movements of the pedals were so fast that
it was hard to keep their feet on the pedals as
they moved.
The group concluded that the VMS, while constrained
by certain inherent limitations, provided insight and was
a beneficial tool for experiencing time synchronized
motions, flight control motions, and displays as opposed
to just looking at tabular or charted data. The VMS
proved to be an important tool for observing the
perceptual cues experienced by the pilots during the
accident sequence and assessing the appropriateness of
the pilot’s inputs and the possible contribution of the
rudder system design. These all proved to be central
issues in the investigation.
Another central issue in the investigation was the
potential role of simulator training in large aircraft
upset recovery taught to the pilots. To assess this
training, the human performance group conducted a
study in the American Airlines A310/300 training
simulator to examine the excessive bank angle
recovery exercise that the accident pilots completed
(NTSB, 2004). Six pilots from the group performed
the exercise six times, employing different recovery
techniques each time. In the first case, the simulator
instructor set up the exercise to replicate the
simulator training that pilots received before this
accident occurred. The pilots were told they were
departing behind a 747 and the instructor initiated an
upset when the airplane was banked at an altitude
between 2,000 and 2,500 feet and traveling about 240
knots. During the upset, the simulator underwent an
uncommanded roll that was randomly set to be either
to the left or the right, followed immediately by a
large uncommanded roll in the opposite direction.
The simulator momentarily inhibited the airplane’s
response to pilot wheel and rudder pedal inputs
during the event to allow the airplane to reach a
substantial bank angle before recovery began. Pilots
were instructed to recover the airplane according to
the method described in the American Airlines

advanced aircraft maneuvering program (AAMP),
using simultaneous, coordinated rudder in
conjunction with control wheel inputs. Each pilot
repeated the procedure five additional times, except
the roll maneuver was initiated during level flight
after the pilot indicated his readiness. The pilots
were instructed to use each of the following five
recovery methods: partial wheel and no rudder, full
wheel and no rudder, full wheel and partial rudder,
full wheel and full rudder, and the pilot’s preference.
In the AAMP recovery method trials, all of the pilots
responded with a full control wheel input (between
77° and 80°) supported by a rudder pedal input
(ranging from 6.7° to 14.5° with an average of 10.8°).
Five of the six pilots used the rudder pedal
simultaneously with the control wheel. Three of the
pilots recovered before the airplane reached a 90°
bank angle, and the other three pilots recovered the
airplane with a maximum bank angle between 108°
and 114°. Four of the pilots stated that they were
surprised by the onset of the event. The four other
prescribed recovery methods showed little difference
in average maximum bank angle reached before
recovery (between 104° and 107°), and none of pilots
recovered before the airplane reached a bank angle of
100°. Three of the six pilots reported that partial
wheel and no rudder was the worst recovery method,
and all six pilots questioned whether this method
provided sufficient control authority for recovery.
Two of the pilots felt that a recovery with full wheel
and full rudder was the worst method because it
created a potential to overcontrol. Data from the full
wheel and full rudder recovery suggested a
discrepancy between the simulator and the airplane
concerning compliance in the rudder control system.
Specifically, at 240 knots, the maximum pedal travel
on the A300-600 should be limited to 7.9°. When the
pilots made full rudder inputs, the maximum pedal
travel varied from 10.3° to 18.9°. Some of the pilots
reported that they were not able to perceive pushing
past the pedal stop when making full pedal inputs in
this condition. When the pilots were allowed to
recover using their own technique, most of the pilots
responded with nearly full wheel and partial rudder
pedal inputs. Slightly less input was made on both
controls compared to trials where pilots were told to
use the AAMP recovery technique, and the pedal
response was typically delayed by at least 1 second
from the initial control wheel input. The pilots
demonstrated a preferred recovery strategy of full
wheel and limited rudder in response to the simulator
exercise. Also, five of the six pilots indicated, at least
once during the six trials, that there was a lack of
flight control response during the initial upset.
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As with the Bombardier Challenger test flight
accident, flight simulation proved to be an invaluable
tool during the investigation of the crash of American
Airlines Flight 587. In this high-profile accident,
unique facilities were used and specific simulator
studies were tailored to address specific human
performance issues that were ultimately determined
to be causal and contributing factors in the crash.
Considerations for Using Flight Simulation as an
Investigative Tool
Building on these experiences, agencies responsible
for accident investigations, like the NTSB, may
consider drafting guidelines for evaluating and
conducting flight simulator activities during the
course of aviation accident investigations.
While simulation is a valuable tool that will likely
have increasing importance in future accident
investigations,
there
are
some
important
considerations to bear in mind that could be
formalized through specific guidelines.
First,
investigators should realize that conducting a
simulation is costly and resource intensive.
Therefore, the benefits to be derived from simulation
should be weighed against these costs and, when
appropriate, less costly alternatives considered. Also,
in designing a simulation, human performance
investigators should understand the limitations of
simulation in general and the comparative
capabilities, advantages, and disadvantages of
different simulators.
For example, training
simulators may be beneficial in examining how
accident flight crews were trained, or examining
procedural issues in an accident, but are not well
suited for examining highly dynamic motions and
accelerations. If the acceleration forces experienced
during an accident event are of particular interest,
then a unique research facility like the VMS may be
needed. Also, if flight control issues arise, training
simulators may be inappropriate because they
typically lack the fidelity and detail to accurately
portray the aircraft’s aerodynamic models to the
extent that can be achieved in an engineering
simulator. In sum, all simulators have limitations and
these limitations should be carefully considered when
deciding if flight simulation is appropriate and
evaluating which particular simulator is best suited to
meet the needs of an investigation.
Specific
simulator limitations should also be identified and
considered when designing and executing a
simulation plan so that member of the investigative
team can understand how these limitations may affect
their experiences and the conclusions that can be
drawn from the simulation study.

Human performance investigators should also bear in
mind some considerations that may limit their ability
to answer fundamental questions regarding accident
causation in the simulator. First, finding naïve
participants may be extremely difficult if not
impossible following a high-profile accident. For
example, in the American Airlines Flight 587
accident,
media
coverage
and
NTSB
recommendations focused attention on pilot use of
the rudder pedal making it impractical to carry out a
simulator study evaluating how certain populations of
pilots might use rudder in response to aircraft upsets.
Another thing to bear in mind is that some broader
issues that arise may be beyond the scope of a
focused accident investigation. For example, the
American Airlines Flight 587 accident raised many
interesting questions regarding the interaction of pilot
rudder inputs and rudder system design that would
require a large-scale research study to fully address.
Formal guidelines for using flight simulation could
help investigators better define the purpose, scope,
and limitations of simulator activities conducted as
part of an aviation accident investigation.
Disclaimer
This paper is based on the author’s activities as a
Senior Human Performance Investigator for the
NTSB. The views expressed in this report are the
author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the
NTSB or the Congressional Research Service.
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